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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LUKYANOV DOCTRINE: CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS OF RUSSIA’S
HYBRID FOREIGN POLICY—THE CASE OF UKRAINE.
IGOR GRETSKIY*
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kremlin’s assertiveness and
unpredictability on the international arena has always provoked enormous
attention to its foreign policy tools and tactics. Although there was no shortage
of publications on topics related to different aspects of Moscow’s foreign policy
varying from non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to soft power diplomacy,
Russian studies as a discipline found itself deadlocked within the limited number
of old dichotomies, (e.g., West/non-West, authoritarianism/democracy,
Europe/non-Europe), initially proposed to understand the logic of Russia’s
domestic and foreign policy transformations. 1 Furthermore, as the decisionmaking process in Moscow was getting further from being transparent due to the
increasingly centralized character of its political system, the emergence of new
theoretical frameworks with greater explanatory power was an even more
difficult task.
Moreover, by the moment the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict began,
Russia studies in the West were gradually plunging into crisis from significant
funding cuts both in private and public sectors. For instance, the American
Government program supporting advanced research on Russia and Eurasia (Title
VIII) was closed in 2013, 2 while funding for promoting area studies and
language education (Title VI) was cut by more than 40% in comparison to the

* Associate professor at the School of International Relations of the St. Petersburg State University.
In 2009, he received his PhD degree in History of International Relations and Foreign Policy. In
2012–2014, he headed the Rectorate's International Office for the Smolny Campus. His research
and academic interests include Russian foreign policy toward the Central and Eastern Europe;
Ukraine's political transformation; theory and practice of post-conflict reconciliation. Dr. Gretskiy
has been an op-ed contributor for a variety of print and electronic media both in Russia and abroad.
1. See Michael McFaul, Choosing Autocracy: Actors, Institutions, and Revolution in the
Erosion of Russian Democracy, 50 COMP. POL. 305, 305–06 (2018); Steven Rosefielde & Romana
Hlouskova, Why Russia is Not a Democracy, 26 COMP. STRATEGY 215, 221 (2007); Andrei
Tsygankov, Finding a Civilisational Idea: “West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia’s
Foreign Policy, 12 GEOPOLITICS 375, 387 (2007).
2. Kenneth Yalowitz & Matthew Rojansky, The Slow Death of Russian and Eurasian
Studies, NAT’L INTEREST (May 23, 2014), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-slow-deathrussian-eurasian-studies-10516 [https://perma.cc/K5XU-QVJE].
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year of 2010. 3 Many well-known American professionals and seasoned
diplomats acknowledged that the governmental institutions, amid the
dramatically deteriorating bilateral relations with Russia, were direly
understaffed with qualified experts on that country. 4
Russia’s illegal Crimea annexation spawned a new wave of interest toward
the Kremlin’s foreign policy, which again was under rigorous scrutiny from the
academic and expert community. In the past five years, there has been an
increasing number of publications trying to explain the standoff between Russia
and Ukraine. Despite some loosely reasoned and controversial attempts 5 to bill
it as “Ukraine’s civil war,” abundant literature on that matter shows there is a
broad consensus among scholars that the conflict was mainly due to the Russian
military’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. 6 In this regard, there are
many issues that continue to bring about debates among academia. It’s still
unclear whether Russia’s intervention came about as a spontaneous decision to
capitalize on the political turmoil in Kyiv, 7 or was it scrupulously planned long
before the Euromaidan happened. Besides, there is no generally accepted
explanation why Russian leadership decided to invade Ukraine. Some say that
the Kremlin’s calculations were dominated by concerns over the stability of the
political regime in Russia. 8 As Sergey Guriyev, a former chief economist at the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, suggested, 9 the Crimea
annexation was extremely helpful in the government’s efforts to distract the
public attention from the economic slowdown, since rallies in Kyiv, amidst
3. Stephen E. Hanson, In Defense of Regional Studies in a Globalized World, ASEEES (April
13, 2015), https://www.aseees.org/news-events/aseees-blog-feed/defense-regional-studies-global
ized-world [https://perma.cc/T9AZ-VUFT].
4. Angela Stent, Why America Doesn’t Understand Putin, WASH. POST (March 14, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-america-doesnt-understand-putin/2014/03/14/81
bc1cd6-a9f4-11e3-b61e-8051b8b52d06_story.html?utm_term=.fecf83e2c647 [https://perma.cc/F
JZ3-74DC]; Jason Horowitz, Russia Experts See Thinning Ranks’ Effect on U.S. Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (March 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/europe/american-experts-onrussia.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KY6Y-TL7M] .
5. Jessee Driscoll, Ukraine’s Civil War: Would Accepting This Terminology Help Resolve
The Conflict?, PONARS EURASIA POLICY MEMO, No. 572, Feb. 2019; Ivan Katchanovski, The
Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?, 17 EUROPEAN POL. AND SOC’Y 473,
475 (2016).
6. Anders Åslund, Kremlin Aggression in Ukraine: The Price Tag, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Kremlin_Aggres
sion_web_040218_ revised.pdf.
7. See Michael Kofman et al., Lessons From Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine, RAND CORP. 1 (2017); Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crime, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 47,
47 (2016).
8. ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINE CRISIS: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WEST 185 (2014).
9. Sergei Guriev, Political Origins and Implications of the Economic Crisis in Russia, in
PUTIN’S RUSSIA: HOW IT ROSE, HOW IT IS MAINTAINED, AND HOW IT MIGHT END 8, 18 (Leon
Aron ed., 2015).
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Vladimir Putin’s slipping approval ratings, might have precipitated protest
activity in Russia.
In this Article, we will underscore the meaning of domestic political factors
that define the Kremlin’s foreign policy design. In fact, they laid the ground for
what we call the “Lukyanov Doctrine”—a foreign policy paradigm that inherited
and fully embraced two fundamental elements of the preceding Brezhnev
Doctrine—a vision based on the concept of limited sovereignty, and the right to
intervene within its “sphere of influence.” The latter includes direct and indirect
support of its proxies to undermine governments of those countries that do not
accept Russia’s leading role in the region. This Article is aimed at tracing and
proving such a continuity in Russian foreign policy based on the example of
Ukraine.
This Article consists of five sections. After providing readers with a critical
analysis of academic literature on the matter and explaining the methodology
chosen, in the second section we formulate the hypothesis to explain the deep
roots of Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine. Notwithstanding the differences
between the Brezhnev Doctrine and the new Russian foreign policy paradigm,
denoted here as “Lukyanov Doctrine,” both have two basic components: the
concept of limited sovereignty, and the unilaterally assumed right to intervene
within the territories perceived as the Kremlin’s exclusive sphere of influence.
As demonstrated in the third section, back in the end of the 1980s, Russian and
Ukrainian political establishments attributed completely divergent meanings to
sovereignty. At the moment the new Russian state resurfaced on the world
political map, among the Russian political elites there was a broad consensus
about Ukraine as a part of the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. Since then this
consensus remains unchanged, as it is shown in section four analyzing the views
and narratives of prominent Russian politicians. Of course, Russia’s illegal
annexation of Crimea would have been hardly possible without wide consent of
the Russian population. In section five, we draw arguments to prove that Russian
society’s post-imperial syndrome was among fundamental premises for the
Lukyanov Doctrine. The final section offers concluding remarks and some
considerations on Russian-Ukrainian relations for the future.
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
At the moment, there is a long record of attempts to explain Russia’s
aggression in Ukraine within the broader theoretical framework. Scholars
delivered several argument-based approaches. The first one, 10 by prioritizing the
geographical factor and Russia’s deeply rooted expansionist tradition, considers
the Kremlin’s aggression toward Ukraine to be something natural and, hence,
quite predictable. Such a view describes post-Soviet Russia as a neo-imperial
10. OSTAP KUSHNIR, UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN NEO-IMPERIALISM: THE DIVERGENT BREAK
92 (2018); AGNIA GRIGAS, BEYOND CRIMEA: THE NEW RUSSIA EMPIRE 4–5 (2016).
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power with many features inherited from its predecessors, i.e. the Tsarist Russia
and the Soviet Union. In this context, expansionism is regarded as Russia’s
modus operandi that makes it predisposed to occupying new territories, which
is assumed to be the end of Moscow’s international efforts. As Van Herpen put
it, colonizing neighbors is “part of Russia’s genetic makeup.” 11 This kind of
historicism admits that every Russian imperial project rested on fundamental
ideological platforms. Nevertheless, it has no clear response to what ideology
underpins the new Russian imperialism. More importantly, history, of course,
could be a generous source for meaningful information to be used by politicians
to justify current political practices, but it can in no way define either the fate of
nations or the future transformations of political regimes. Otherwise, post-Soviet
republics, doomed to merely be Russian colonies, would have never gained
independence and sovereignty.
At the same time, quite a few researchers have addressed the Russia-Ukraine
war issue through the lens of “realism,” as they call it, assuming that
international relations is a field for eternal competition between the great powers
over regional and global influence. Among the proponents of such a vision, it is
common to follow John Mearsheimer’s argumentation based on the conviction
that the Ukrainian crisis was another round of a longstanding East-West
geopolitical confrontation sparked by the eastward enlargement of the EU and
NATO, which forced Putin to “defend” Russia’s backyard from “dangerous
encroachment by Western nations.” 12 They deem, therefore, the Kremlin’s
policy was a reaction to the process of Ukraine’s drift westwards to the EuroAtlantic community, which allegedly violated the integrity of Russia’s “sphere
of interests.” In this case, Ukraine is pictured not as a victim suffering from
Kremlin’s aggression, but rather as a rule-breaker, which, along with the West,
fully shares all the responsibility for the conflict. This, in fact, fully corresponds
with the Russian elites’ take on the situation in Ukraine.
Sometimes, when “realists” justify Moscow’s hostile efforts to tackle
Ukraine’s “geopolitical disloyalty” over “geopolitical concerns,” 13 one can even
find their theoretical paradigm very much alike to primitive geopolitics, which
neglects internal aspects of the decision-making process and, eventually,
oversimplifies the general picture of Russian-Ukrainian conflict. But what is
most confusing about it is that some points made by “realists” echo the official
Russian narrative, literally. For instance, Richard Sakwa accuses the West and
Kyiv authorities for being blinded by “Russophobia,” confusing the latter with

11. MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN, PUTIN’S WARS: THE RISE OF RUSSIA’S NEW IMPERIALISM 2
(2014).
12. Andrei Tsygankov, Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: The Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy,
31 POST-SOVIET AFF. 295, 297 (2015).
13. Elias Götz, Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy, 1991–Present, 22 CONTEMPOR.
POL. 307, 307–308 (2016).
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explicit disapproval of Putin’s politics. 14 Besides, without doing a thorough
analysis of the Soviet laws himself, Sakwa contested 15 the legality of the 1954
cession of Crimea to Ukraine, referring to highly manipulative, sophisticated
and fallacious argumentation by Sergey Baburin, a prominent leader of Russian
radical nationalists, who—disregarding international law, as well as Soviet and
Russian legislation—always considered the peninsula to be “Russia’s sovereign
territory.” 16 Apparently, today “realists” sympathies are with Putin’s Russia
desperately resisting “Atlanticist hegemony and global dominance.” 17 But,
highly likely, it’s not only about their ideological preferences, but rather their
practical aim, despite evident deficits in argumentation, to fill a certain niche on
the market, being aware that among different political groupings (extreme
leftists, anarchists, alter-globalists, Putin fans, etc.) there exists a largely unmet
demand for a “more balanced” view on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Not surprisingly, “realist” theoretical insights are constantly subjected to
overt criticism over selective interpretation of data concerning the Kremlin’s
military involvement in Ukraine, as well as over their downplay of Russia’s
blunt violations of its sovereign commitments to follow the international law.
As Kuzio and D’Anieri noted correctly, “[T]he ‘realist’ analysis of the UkraineRussia conflict . . . contradicts fundamental tenets of realist theory,” and “in
many respects . . . [it] is not realist at all.” 18 Different branches of realism
consider anarchy to be natural to international relations and, hence, the first thing
the states seek is survival, which is an essential prerequisite to other ends and
goals that a state may have. 19 That is, every state is wired to exist in a highly
competitive environment with great powers prone to domination. As
Mearsheimer himself wrote, “[s]ince no state is likely to achieve global
hegemony . . . the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition.” 20
Oddly, this contrasts sharply with how he perceives the Ukraine crisis, blaming
Washington for attempts “to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold.” 21
According to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, it’s not about Washington but
the very nature of the international relations that makes states relentlessly seek
power. For example, “[g]reat powers behave aggressively not because they want
14. RICHARD SAKWA, FRONTLINE UKRAINE: CRISIS IN THE BORDERLANDS 233 (2015);
Richard Sakwa, ‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Years’ Crisis? Russia and International Politics, 84
INT’L AFF. 241, 253 (2008).
15. SAKWA, FRONTLINE UKRAINE, supra note 14, at 108.
16. Leonid Terentyev, Objedenitel’nyj sjezd russkikh w Krymu, KOMMERS., Apr. 1, 1997, at
3.
17. SAKWA, FRONTLINE UKRAINE, supra note 14, at 234.
18. TARAS KUZIO & PAUL D’ANIERI, THE SOURCES OF RUSSIA’S GREAT POWER POLITICS:
UKRAINE AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE EUROPEAN ORDER 8 (2018).
19. See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 91–92 (1979).
20. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 2 (2001).
21. John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault, 93 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
77, 77 (2014).
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to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but because they have
to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival.” 22 In this
context, Mearsheimer’s calling upon Washington to reverse its policy in the
region by halting democracy promotion and EU and NATO enlargement, in
order not to compete with Russia for influence in Ukraine, means he wants the
United States to leave the eternal battle for survival. Rather oddly, the Bill
Clinton administration, excoriated by Mearsheimer over its “liberal
imperialism,” seems to be a much more earnest protagonist of the “offensive
realism,” than Mearsheimer himself. 23
In this Article, I reject historicism and proceed from the assumption that
foreign policy is not a straight concrete tunnel with no opportunity to turn right
or left. That is, the state’s behavior on international arena is not entirely dictated
by its historical experience. Likewise, I do not anthropomorphize either the state
(like realism does) or entities of states (like geopolitics do). Instead, I come from
the point that the state’s behavior in the international arena strongly depends on
political elites’ beliefs about international relations, perceptions of a country’s
role in it, as well as rational calculations about the use of those ideas for
sustaining, or gaining more, power and influence within the socio-political
hierarchy. A peculiarly concentrated form of those beliefs and perceptions
constitute a foreign policy doctrine. The latter, for the purposes of this Article,
is understood as a set of certain ideas—not as an officially codified compendium
of instruments and goals to achieve on the international arena, which is
periodically published by the government.
In the case of Russia, I deliberately exclude from this analysis official
Foreign Policy Concepts, and there are two reasons for that. First, this type of
document traditionally does not reflect all the specificity of political elites’ way
of thinking. It would be a bit naïve to expect Moscow to overtly acknowledge
its adherence to the limited sovereignty concept. Second, the Kremlin’s
“Concepts” always lag behind its real foreign policy activities. Such documents
are, to a large extent, a description of measures already taken and implemented,
and not a strategic plan for the future. For instance, the Kremlin began focusing
on increasing its propaganda potential by establishing Russia Today, Sputnik,
Russkiy Mir Foundation, as well as reforming the Rossotrudnichestvo agency
with its tremendously increased budget, long before the term “soft power” was
mentioned for the first time ever in the 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept. 24
As Bobo Lo put it precisely, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept is “the post-Soviet

22. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 20, at 21.
23. John J. Mearsheimer, Imperial by Design, THE NAT’ INT., Jan/Feb, 2011, at 16–34.
24. Kontseptsija Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii, President of the Russian Federation
Decree, 251 (Feb. 12, 2013), http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bd
c3.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWK5-PPC6].
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spiritual successor to the USSR’s Five-Year Plan . . . meant to create an
alternative reality that is largely divorced from the true state of affairs.” 25
THE HYPOTHESIS: “LUKYANOV DOCTRINE”
Since the very beginning of the Cold War, the Kremlin’s leadership regarded
the Central and East European countries as a kind of “near abroad” of the Soviet
empire, which constituted a zone of its special interests. To consolidate Soviet
influence in the region, Stalin made sure all disloyal political forces were
removed from power, giving way to totally compliant and dependent
Communist governments. With the exception, perhaps, of Tito’s Yugoslavia,
“people’s democracies” enjoyed a very limited sovereignty, as they were under
full political control from Moscow. Deviations from the Soviet interpretation of
Socialism, at that time, were severely punished by repression and purges of the
party apparatus.
After Stalin’s death, Moscow was seemingly weakening its grasp on its
satellites, which was reflected in the Belgrade Declaration of 1955. 26 This
document was not only about reducing tensions in the Soviet-Yugoslav
relations. In fact, it purported a start of a new, although extremely short, period
of Soviet foreign policy towards the CEE countries, based on the principle of
recognition that “the differences in specific forms of the development of
socialism are exclusively a matter of the peoples of individual countries.” 27
However, the suppressed Hungarian uprising of 1956 clearly demonstrated that
the Kremlin perceived profound economic transformations as a threat both to
political stability, and the Soviet preponderance in the region. Later, in 1968,
such a vision laid the basis for the Brezhnev Doctrine, which dominated the
Kremlin’s foreign policy until the Soviet empire eventually collapsed.
According to it, a threat to Socialism in a single country was a threat to the whole
“Socialist community” and a reason for providing “military assistance to
fraternal countries.” 28
In the end of the 1980s, a deteriorating economic situation made the Soviet
government reshape its foreign policy agenda regarding its client states. Moscow
was no longer able to provide sufficient economic assistance to them, as well as
guarantee the stability of loyal political regimes by military means. Besides,
what was happening in the CEE countries had been placed on the back burner,
as centrifugal trends were gathering momentum within the Soviet state. In most
Soviet republics, real power and influence were gradually passing to the hands
25. BOBO LO, RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA: REALITY, ILLUSION AND
MYTHMAKING 67–68 (2002).
26. Deklaratsiia pravitel’stv Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Federativnoi
Narodnoi Respubliki Yugoslaviia, PRAVDA, June 3, 1955, at 1–2.
27. Id.
28. Rech tovarischa L. I. Brezhneva, PRAVDA, Nov. 13, 1968, at 1–2.
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of first secretaries, chairmen of the Supreme Soviets and local party elites. While
the distance between the Kremlin and the Union republics was rapidly
increasing, Mikhail Gorbachev was desperately seeking solutions to reform
relations with the them. The way the “Novo-Ogarevo process” took place
suggests that the USSR was no longer a country with a monolithic political
system with strictly vertical decision-making. And the Soviet leadership’s key
task was to keep the republics within a single state. The problem was, however,
that the bankrupt government in Moscow had very limited resources to get the
republican elites interested in such a project.
However, there remained tools of negative motivation at the Kremlin’s
disposal. The key goal was to actively oppose the sovereignization of Soviet
republics through provoking or aggravating security threats, undermining their
territorial integrity, as well as discrediting ideas of independence and
democracy. To reach this goal, the Kremlin applied such tools as incitement of
separatism, economic blackmailing, initiating territorial claims, covert military
operations, etc. Likewise, when Moscow selectively escalates its tough rhetoric
in condemning the government in Kyiv for alleged violations of the rights of the
Russian-speaking population, it seeks to aggravate political tensions within
Ukraine through fomenting separatist sentiments among the population.
In this Article, such a policy is designated as the “Lukyanov doctrine.” It
stems from the traditional Soviet perception of the international relations as an
arena for competition and rivalry between “great powers,” “centers of power,”
or “poles.” At that time a ‘pole’ was understood to be a fully sovereign subject
of international relations, which had an ability to project its interests beyond its
territory, thereby forming its special sphere of responsibility with an exclusive
right to intervene in the domestic affairs of “supervised” countries. Richard
Pipes was absolutely accurate when claiming that post-Soviet Russia’s foreign
policy was guided by a “modified Brezhnev Doctrine.” 29 Indeed, just like the
USSR, the new Russia, although its foreign policy ambitions had been far more
modest, kept on trying to create its own “sphere of influence” that covered postSoviet area only. Still, despite the fact the Lukyanov Doctrine has a lot in
common with its conceptual predecessor, there are plenty of differences between
them. First, the Brezhnev Doctrine has been “defensive” by its nature. It was
meant to protect the commonwealth of “Peoples’ Democracies” from any
ideological contravention. As soon as within the Social bloc all the Central and
East European states were forcibly redesigned to become “miniature models of
the Soviet system,” 30 any smaller transformation might have undesirable effects
for both the Soviet empire, and coherence of its sphere of influence. Conversely,
the Lukyanov Doctrine can be seen as an offensive or expansionist concept
29. Richard Pipes, Is Russia Still An Enemy?, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 65, 73 (1997).
30. ROBERT A. JONES, THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF ‘LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY’ FROM LENIN TO
GORBACHEV: THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE 2 (1990).
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aimed at reestablishing control over “timely independent” territories, but
without exporting Russia’s “sovereign democracy” model. Second, the
Brezhnev Doctrine leaned on Communist ideology and its dogmas to legitimate
military interventions, whereas the Lukyanov Doctrine has no clearly defined
ideological basis. Today, the Kremlin resorts to a humanitarian narrative to
justify its aggressive and virulent behavior on the international arena. Third, the
Brezhnev doctrine was predominantly focused on Warsaw pact members, while
the Lukyanov doctrine was mainly about the post-Soviet area.
As in most cases with foreign policy doctrines, the title of this one is
conditional and symbolic. The doctrine is named after Anatoly Lukyanov, the
former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The peak of his political
career came in the years of “perestroika”—a period of significant changes in all
spheres of social and political life of the Soviet state. Feeling himself more
comfortable with the role of “grey cardinal,” Lukyanov consistently supported
economic reforms initiated by Gorbachev, but since the summer of 1990, he
began to emerge from the shadow of the Soviet President. He had a rather weak
appetite for foreign policy issues, but he proved to be among the most outspoken
critics of Gorbachev’s plans to reform the Soviet political and administrative
structure. Lukyanov fervently denied the idea of reshaping the USSR into the
Union of Sovereign States. This brought him closer to the conservative wing of
the nomenclatura, and he finally joined the putschists after September 1990,
when it became clear that Gorbachev would not use force in his struggle against
Boris Yeltsin.
Lukyanov often emphasized that his position on the reform of the Union
derived from Gorbachev’s tactics. According to him, to fully control the NovoOgaryovo process of negotiations, Gorbachev, aspiring to be an arbiter in all the
possible debates, assigned the function of protecting the USSR to Lukyanov. 31
Nevertheless, there is evidence that Lukyanov’s conservatism had not
pragmatic, but ideological foundations. For example, after the collapse of the
USSR, he proceeded with politics, being a member of the State Duma and
representing the Communist Party. During his election campaigns, he often
argued that the most important foreign policy goal of Russia was to “restore the
Union of Soviet Peoples.” 32 Lukyanov even considered it to be inevitable. 33
Like many other old-line Communist party bosses, Lukyanov upheld
traditional views on a Union republic’s sovereignty, according to which the latter
was granted by the Bolsheviks since it allegedly had never existed before. For
instance, when in the late 1980s Moldovan authorities refused to sign a new
agreement establishing the Soviet Union, Lukyanov said in response, “if you do

31. ANATOLY LUKYANOV, PEREVOROT MNIMYI I NASTOIASCHII. 37 (1993).
32. ANATOLY LUKYANOV, V VODOVOROTE ROSSIISKOI SMUTY.: KNIGA I BIZNES 134 (1999).
33. Interview with Anatoly Lukyanov, URAL’SKIJ RABOCHIJ (Nov. 14, 1994).
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not sign it, you will get two Moldovas.” 34 Of course, he meant Transnistria,
which the Soviet leadership used as the main argument to prevent Moldova from
leaving the USSR. Moscow insisted that after having left the Union, independent
Moldova would not be able to maintain its territorial integrity. The Kremlin used
similar argumentation in its policy toward Ukraine. Soviet leadership believed
the Ukrainian state could only exist as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
within the Soviet Union. 35 This was thought to be the appropriate and only
possible form of Ukrainian nationhood.
Lukyanov Doctrine arose due to three factors. The first was the total absence
of a positive agenda for the Soviet, and in the not-too-distant-future independent,
republics. Moscow failed to devise a new attractive integration project instead
of the crashed Communist “bright future” concept. The Soviet and Russian
political elites simply had no other arguments to maintain Kremlin’s political
preponderance in the region, other than tools of negative motivation. The second
was the need to distract people’s attention from bad developments in the
economy through demonstrating strength on international arena. After the
demise of the USSR, Russians were predominantly hit by the post-imperial
syndrome, feeling nostalgia about the “great” Soviet past. Amid the economic
slump and lack of clear prospects for increase in living standards, promoting
revisionist agenda was the easiest way to rapidly gain political capital. Instead
of drawing a clear line between the old Soviet and new Russian values and
priorities, the politicians started, in fact, competing with each other to exploit
social frustration. That is, Russia’s foreign policy has been driven by political
elites’ rational considerations aimed at maximizing the scope and legitimacy of
their power. Therefore, as Bukkvoll properly noted, for Russian politicians
Ukraine has become a kind of an arena to demonstrate patriotism. 36
The third factor was the Kremlin’s inability to openly initiate military
intervention regarding (post-) Soviet republics, thereby affecting directly their
domestic and foreign policies. By the beginning of Gorbachev’s rule, among the
Soviet elite, there was a common understanding that Afghanistan was a grave
mistake, and the introduction of troops into countries of the Socialist
commonwealth undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet dominance in the
region. 37 Besides, Gorbachev set a high value on the ongoing negotiations with
Washington on critically important issues such as nuclear disarmament and
34. Maxim Sokolov, Separatizm kak orudie vneshnei politiki: konets lukyanovskoi diplomatii,
KOMMERS., Mar. 22, 1995.
35. VLADIMIR YU. VASILIEV, et al., POLITICHESKOIE RUKOVODSTVO UKRAINY, 1938–1989
138–142 (2006).
36. Tor Bukkvoll, Off the Cuff Politics:Explaining Russia’s Lack of a Ukraine Strategy, 53
EUR.-ASIA STUD., 1141, 1143 (2001).
37. Dmitry Belanovsky, O vyvode sovetskich voisk iz Afganistana - Interview with A.S.
Chernyaev, GORBACHEV FOUND. (Feb. 14, 2019), http://www.gorby.ru/presscenter/news/show
_29975 [https://perma.cc/6E6E-3S5P].
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limits on conventional armed forces in Europe. This was a top priority for the
Soviet leadership, since it could allow the Soviet government to simultaneously
reduce the burden on the economy and at the same time to leave the arms race
without high image costs. Open armed intervention against one of the Soviet
republics could endanger the negotiation process. Up until 2014, the traumatic
experience of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, as well as the need
for Western investments and technology, made the Kremlin consider a military
crackdown in post-Soviet republics to be a risky way of sustaining Russia’s
status as a “great power.” As soon as the costs of open military intervention
markedly exceeded possible political advantages, providing military support to
separatist movements seemed to be the best available strategy.
The fourth factor was the general inertia in the West’s perception of Russia.
For the Western politicians, it was the Russian government’s ability to control
both nuclear and conventional weapons to be of critical importance, rather than
the pace and the quality of democratic transformations. Some Western
intellectuals, in the mid-1990s, were able to discern revanchist ambitions of the
re-emerging “normal great power,” but their apprehension was not taken into
account. 38 Instead of providing its foreign policy toward Russia with principlebased foundation, Western leaders bet on personal relations with Boris Yeltsin,
which contributed to the legitimization of the Lukyanov Doctrine. Turning a
blind eye to Russia’s military intervention in Moldova and other post-Soviet
countries, as well as its increasingly confrontational rhetoric, Western leaders
continued supporting Boris Yeltsin both politically and financially. This not only
helped discredit the ideas of democracy within Russian society, but also
encouraged the Kremlin to take further aggressive actions in the region.
This Article claims that since the late 1980s these four factors have remained
intact. Since then, the Lukyanov Doctrine has been an integral part of foreign
policy of both the USSR and Russia, which is explicitly evident in the case of
Ukraine.
THE TWO DIVERGENT SOVEREIGNTIES
In the late 1980s, there were several factors that defined the future of the
Soviet empire, including the political standoff between Mikhail Gorbachev and
Boris Yeltsin. The former, seeking to keep himself in power amid a crumbling
economy and growing public frustration, was reliant on support of the
Communist party nomenklatura and the bureaucracy. Gorbachev announced
profound socio-economic changes in the USSR, but with the preservation of the
effective political control and external attributes of power. Accordingly, he
admitted the need to foster genuine political competition, but only within the
Communist party. 39 Yeltsin seemed, at that time, to represent a more reformist
38. Henry Kissinger, Beware: A Threat Abroad, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1996, at 42.
39. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, SOBRANIE SOCHINENII, vol. 18, 72 (2008).
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wing of the political establishment, but in many respects his vision was not that
different from Gorbachev’s. A group of politicians supporting Yeltsin did not
seek radical changes that might lead to disintegration of the USSR, they just
wanted to squeeze out the decrepit party leaders from the Kremlin cabinets. To
this end, Yeltsin, trying to enlist the support of republicans elites in a struggle
for power against Gorbachev, concluded agreements on cooperation and mutual
recognition of sovereignty with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other Soviet
republics. 40 At that moment, their sovereignty was seen as a temporary
concession to the republican leadership before the conclusion of a new union
treaty.
In June 1990, a group of deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, following Russia
and Moldova, initiated debates on the need to proclaim national sovereignty. 41
Importantly, the Ukrainian understanding of sovereignty was completely
different from the Russian one. Unlike Yeltsin and his entourage, most
Ukrainian politicians perceived sovereignty not as a means, but as a real goal.
This can be easily verified by comparing texts of the two declarations. The
biggest difference was that in the text of the Ukrainian declaration words
“independent” or “independently” were used nine times, while the Russian
declaration did not mention them at all.42 Russia, in every possible way,
emphasized that its sovereignty lay strictly within the USSR. Ukraine, on the
contrary, promulgated its right to have a national army and internal troops,
national currency, as well as independent foreign policy. Additionally, the
Verkhovna Rada proclaimed the principle of inviolability of its borders and
Ukraine’s right to a share of the all-Union property and cultural heritage. In
short, the 1990 Ukraine declaration of sovereignty claimed all the attributes of
an independent state.
At that moment, after the reform of the Supreme Soviets came into force,
granting them real legislative powers, Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada was headed
by Vladimir Ivashko. He faced a very difficult dilemma, either support the
parliamentary majority and sign the declaration, which might, of course,
provoke the Kremlin’s anger, or, alternatively, not sign the document, which, in
its turn, might trigger a prolonged conflict between the chairman and the
deputies. Ivashko picked the second option, remaining completely loyal to
Gorbachev. He left for Moscow to be designated to the position of deputy
secretary general of the CPSU, which was created for him exclusively. The
declaration of sovereignty was eventually adopted and signed by the new
40. Dogovor mezhdu Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respublikoi i
Ukrainskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respublikoi, (Vedomosti S’ezda narodnykh depytatov
RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR), Nov. 19, 1990, No. 27 at 482–485.
41. Deklaratsiia pro derzhavnyi suverenitet Ukrainy, (Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady URSR),
1990, No. 31 at 429.
42. Deklaratsiia o gosudarstvennom suverenitete RSFSR, (Vedomosti S’ezda narodnykh
depytatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR), July 16, 1990, No. 2 at 44–46.
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chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, Leonid Kravchuk, who
later became the first president of Ukraine. 43
Such a tough Ukraine declaration of sovereignty was extremely beneficial
for Boris Yeltsin at that moment, as it significantly undermined Gorbachev’s
political clout and the “Novo-Ogaryovo process” that was aimed to preserve the
USSR. However, when Ukraine immediately after the coup of 1991 adopted a
declaration of independence, Yeltsin’s reaction was completely different. Right
after the coup of 1991, he sent a delegation to Kyiv to convince Leonid Kravchuk
to play the situation back and to abolish the declaration. Meanwhile, Yeltsin’s
spokesman Pavel Voschanov made a statement that if Ukraine continued its way
toward independence, Russia would reserve the right to claim some Ukrainian
territories. 44 This was evidence that Yeltsin did not want the USSR to collapse.
Instead, his aim was to be a top politician in the Soviet Union, and the
proclamation of Ukraine’s independence did not meet his expectations.
Subsequently, Yeltsin recognized the independence of Ukraine for pragmatic
reasons. As Serhii Plokhy correctly noted, without Ukraine, Yeltsin had no
chance to become the next president of the USSR. 45 In a Union without Ukraine,
any Muslim politician (the most likely candidates at that time were the President
of Kazakh SSR Nursultan Nazarbayev and the President of Tatarstan Mentimer
Shaimiev) could easily surpass him during a hypothetical presidential election,
as the non-Slavic electorate would have constituted the majority.
RUSSIA’S POLITICAL ELITES & UKRAINE’S INDEPENDENCE
To what extent were the main provisions of the Lukyanov Doctrine popular
among the Russian politicians? What place did it take in Russia’s foreign policy
toward Ukraine? To answer those questions, it would be worth stratifying the
political establishment on several groups and analyzing statements by their key
representatives on Russian-Ukrainian border and territorial claims regarding the
neighboring country.
It should be said that all the classifications of political elites that exist today
are conditional, and the whole variety of existing ideological paradigms cannot
be reduced to them. Nevertheless, differentiating between several influential
political groups has been a time-proven and widely used instrument among
scholars to better understand Russia’s political reality. It is common practice to
identify the three most numerous political groups in Russia as to its foreign
43. Later, in August 1991, Vladimir Ivashko was a member of the delegation to accompany
Mikhail Gorbachev from his imprisonment in Foros, and with the collapse of the USSR he left
politics to become an ordinary pensioner. Vladimir Ivashko; Gorbachev Aide, Communist Party
Leader, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1994), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-11-20-mn65082-story.html [https://perma.cc/P83Z-6BAB].
44. Pavel Voschanov, Zaiavlenie press-sekretaria Prezidenta RSFSR, NEZAVISIMAIA
GAZETA, Aug. 27, 1991, at 1.
45. SERHII PLOKHY, THE LAST EMPIRE: THE FINAL DAYS OF THE SOVIET UNION, 359 (2014).
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policy priorities: liberals, moderates, and nationalists. 46 Some authors propose a
larger number of groups—four or more. However, these classifications became
more sophisticated, as a rule, due to the fragmentation of bigger groupings into
smaller fractions, which does not yield new insights into the functioning of
Russian political cuisine. Typically, scholars add two more groups: first,
proponents of the idea of a great power and, second, geopolitical balancers.
Since the great-power rhetoric and passion for geopolitics were, and remain,
endemic to the overwhelming majority of the Russian political class, it would
not be entirely correct to single out separate groups on that basis—as Mankoff 47
and Spechler 48 do, for instance.
In this study, it would be more appropriate to apply the classification
proposed by Alexei Arbatov in 1993. 49 Having analyzed the views of not only
politicians, but a wide number of public opinion leaders and prominent
academics as well, he distinguished four major groups: 1) westerners, 2)
moderate liberals, 3) centrist and moderate conservatives, and 4) neocommunists and nationalists. 50 Despite a quarter of a century passing since then,
Arbatov’s approach remains relevant and applicable. Only the proportion of
political clout between these groups has changed, not the core ideas that have
been dominating the Russian society since the demise of the Soviet Union.
Arbatov’s classification is particularly useful because each group includes the
names of politicians, diplomats, scholars, and journalists. This is helpful in
tracing the dynamics of Russian political elites’ attitudes regarding Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity through analyzing its representatives’ public
speeches and publications. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research,
Arbatov’s classification needs to be slightly adapted. The difference between the
first and the second groups seems to be insignificant, especially when it comes
to Russia’s “near abroad” policy. Therefore, it makes sense to combine
Westerners and moderate liberals into one group called “liberals.”
In the early 1990s, the liberals were not an indisputably dominating cohort
of the Russian elite; however, they did represent a rather influential force among
the Russian President’s near circle. During the first year of his presidency,
Yeltsin leaned on them heavily. At that time, the liberal group consisted of a
motley audience, among which there were many representatives of the Russian
diplomatic corps led by Andrey Kozyrev, whom Arbatov described as a pro-

46. Andrew Kuchins & Igor Zevelev, Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change, 35
WASH. Q. 147, 148 (2012).
47. Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin, 55 PROBS. OF
POST-COMMUNISM 42, 44–50 (2008).
48. Dina Rome Spechler, Russian Foreign Policy During the Putin Presidency: The Impact
of Competing Approaches, 57 PROBS. OF POST-COMMUNISM 35, 39–41 (2010).
49. Alexei Arbatov, Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives, 18 INT’L SEC. 4–43 (1993).
50. Id.
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Western politician. 51 The Russian minister really considered the rapprochement
between his country and the West to be strategically sound and perspective. In
Kozyrev’s opinion, by becoming a democratic state, Russia would be gravitating
toward the European community of consolidated democracies. 52
In the meantime, on the issue of the use of armed forces in relations with
Russia’s neighbors, the liberals retained considerable flexibility, allowing for
the limited use of military measures in foreign policy. Minister Kozyrev and his
deputies considered the newly independent states to be the greatest source of
threats to Russia’s security, which, in his opinion, made Moscow continue its
military presence in the region. 53 He maintained that Russia’s key foreign policy
goal was its transformation from a superpower into a “normal great power,”
which considerably overlapped with the ideas of moderate conservatives and
even nationalists. 54 It is not surprising that Kozyrev was often accused of being
sympathetic with pan-Slavism and Slavophilism. 55 To put it in other words,
geopolitics and neo-imperial narratives were deeply immanent to the political
philosophy and views of Russian liberals. They believed Russia’s political and
economic integration with the West was compatible with preserving the sphere
of influence, which was supposed to embrace the former Soviet republics, and,
first of all, Ukraine.
In literature, it is generally accepted that the end of 1993 was the turning
point in Russia’s foreign policy, when the Russian government boldly embraced
the great-power narrative. 56 Analysts deem it was due to Yeltsin’s reaction to
the victory of radical nationalists and neo-Communists in the elections to the
State Duma in December 1993. 57 Others consider it to be brought about by the
fact that Yeltsin, after he dissolved the parliament and took over unlimited power
in the country, had no further need for post-Soviet leaders’ support of his illegal
actions regarding Russia’s Supreme Soviet. 58 If anything, those explanations are
not enough to regard the change in official rhetoric as a fundamental shift in
foreign policy. It is quite the opposite: the essence of Russia’s foreign policy
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 9.
Period pervogo znakomstva s Zapadom proshel’, KOMMERS., Dec. 5, 1992.
MID izbavliaietsia ot ‘bieloviezhskogo sindroma, KOMMERS, Jan. 19, 1994, at 3.
See, e.g. Andrei Kozyrev, Soyuz ostabil Rossii plokhole vneshnepolitticheskole,
NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA, Apr. 1, 1992; Andrei Kozyrev, Na ch’ei storone Rossiia v Yugoslavskom
konflikte, IZVESTI, June 8, 1992, at 1, 4; Obsuzhdaietsia kontseptsiia vnieshniej politiki,
KOMMERS., Nov. 28, 1992, at 11.
55. Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaia, Novyi pan-slavizm? Diplomatiia v mashinie vriemieni,
NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA, June 25, 1992.
56. Peter Shearman, Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic
Politics, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1, 1–27 (Roger E. Kanet et al.
eds., 1997).
57. Margot Light, In Search of An Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and The End of Ideology,
19 J. OF COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 42, 45–46 (2003).
58. Id.
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remained the same. What Russian decision-makers previously kept in mind, or
expressed behind the scenes, simply went public for reasons of political
expediency. This primarily concerned the widespread caustic disparagement and
disregard of Ukraine as an independent state, its sovereignty, and its territorial
integrity.
For instance, during negotiations in New York in October 1991, Kozyrev
told Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko that one of the million-plus
population cities in the East of Ukraine, presumably having in mind Donetsk,
always was and would remain Russian. 59 In addition, while preparing the Big
Treaty, the Russian delegation tried to insist on vague definitions regarding the
Russian-Ukrainian border. 60 Furthermore, in January 1992, Russia’s Supreme
Soviet adopted a resolution that put into question the legality of the 1954 transfer
of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine. 61 Interestingly, among the partisans of
asserting territorial claims, there were deputies whom Arbatov assigned to
liberals. The initiative group was headed by Yevgeny Kozhokin and Vladimir
Lukin, the future co-founder of the liberal Yabloko party. The latter, in his
explanatory note to the draft resolution, recommended the Kremlin demonstrate
to Ukraine an iron fist, to make Kyiv more pliant and docile in the matter of the
Black Sea fleet, as well as to make the whole world respect Russia as a strong
power. 62 Lukin also expected the territorial dispute with Ukraine to generate a
patriotic upsurge in Russia, which would provide the government with more
room to foster economic reforms. 63
Those whom Arbatov classified as moderate conservatives—Alexander
Rutskoi, Ruslan Khazbulatov, Arkady Volsky, Sergey Stankevich, Oleg
Rumiantsev, Sergei Karaganov and others—were negative about the very idea
of Ukrainian independence. 64 However, in terms of career growth, most of them
benefited from the collapse of the USSR and the elimination of the Communist
party monopoly. That is why they were not that critical about the Belovezha
Accords. 65 For instance, tumultuous events of the perestroika turned Oleg
Rumiantsev, a Moscow lawyer under the age of 30, into the co-author of the
Russian Constitution. Still, representatives of this group were extremely
supportive of the territorial claims against Ukraine, as great power rhetoric
strengthened their political clout. Rumiantsev, for instance, fully shared the idea
59. ANATOLIY M. ZLENKO, DIPLOMATIIA I POLITIKA: UKRAINA V PROTSESSE
380 (2004).
60. Id. at 429.
61. Vedomosti S’ezda narodnykh depytatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1992 No.
6 at 242.
62. Maksim Sokolov, VS RF: Ofigienie v Tavridie, KOMMERS., Jan. 27, 1992.
63. Id.
64. Alexei G. Arbatov, Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives, 18 INT’L SEC. 5, 4–43 (1993).
65. See RUSLAN I. KHASBULATOV, POLURASPAD SSSR: KAK RAZVALILI SVERKHDERZHAVU
483 (2011).
DINAMICHNYKH GEOPOLITICHESKIKH PEREMEN
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of holding a referendum in Crimea on its accession to Russia within a ten-year
transition period. 66 In the meantime, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, Yeltsin’s overt
antagonists, boldly sponsored the abolishment of the Soviet legislation that
enabled the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine calling Kyiv to immediately start. 67
Both of them were regretting the breakup of the Soviet Union and foretelling a
murky future for an independent Ukraine, but at the same time they had no clear
solution to propose, except bilateral negotiations. In fact, moderate
conservatives didn’t seem to be ready to go so far as to extend the conflict with
Ukraine beyond verbal squabbling. Rather it was just about cynical tactics of
consolidating popular support through profiteering on the post-imperial
syndrome of Russian society.
Neo-Communists and nationalists were among the staunchest opponents of
Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. They strongly advocated the
denunciation of the Belovezha Accords, which they considered to be a “political
falsification” 68 that led to “the greatest tragedy and crime” 69—the collapse of
the USSR. They did not dispute any Soviet legal act concerning the
administrative-territorial borders of the Ukrainian SSR, but considered the
independence of Ukraine itself illegal and erroneous. Nationalists criticized the
Belovezha Accords from slightly different positions. To them, the document was
a “self-betrayal,” 70 and the “illegitimate” dissolution of the Soviet Union
constituted a fatal blow to the unity of Slavic peoples, which had existed in the
times of both the Russian Empire and the USSR. Nationalists strived to “restore
historical justice” 71 through recreating a greater state inhabited by peoples united
by a “single common Russian fate,” 72 and therefore they supported territorial
claims against Ukraine. 73 Sergei Baburin, for instance, claimed that Crimea is
not an intra-Ukrainian affair, “it’s Russia’s problem—a problem of
reconstruction of the Russian state.” 74 In his view, post-Soviet states were
merely shards of the “Russian civilization,” and Russia’s historic mission was
to reconsolidate the “Russian superethnos” in an imperial state called “the
66. MIKHAIL KARPOV, My dolzhny uchastvovať v priniatii reshenii, NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA,
May 13, 1992.
67. Postanovlenie No. 2809-I, 21 May 1992, (Vedomosti S’ezda narodnykh depytatov RSFSR
i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR), June 4, 1992, No. 22 at 1178.
68. GENNADII A. ZYUGANOV, NA RUBEZHE TYSIACHELETII: SUD’BA ROSSII V.
SOVREMENNOM MIRE 27 (2001).
69. ANATOLII I. LUKYANOV, V VODOVOROTE ROSSIISKOI SMUTY: RAZMYSHLENIIA, DIALOGI
DOKUMENTY 189 (1999).
70. NATAL’IA A. NAROCHNITSKAIA, RUSSKII MIR 145 (2007).
71. Id. at 265.
72. Id. at 288.
73. Priamaia rech, KOMMERS., Mar. 5, 1999, at 12.
74. Transcript of State of Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Apr. 14,
1995), available at http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/3070/ [https://perma.cc/C7D6-23VX] (last
visited Nov, 13, 2019).
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Russian Union.” 75 This was very consonant with the nationalistic convictions of
Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsin, who believed that the independence of
Ukraine was a false historical path, and its post-Soviet borders were factitious. 76
It is plain to see that an important feature of Russian political elite mindset—
whether it comes to Liberals, moderate Conservatives, neo-Communists or
Nationalists—is the dominance of an excessively reduced neo-Realist paradigm
laced with primitive geopolitics. According to it, there are only six to seven
“great powers,” with absolute sovereignty and independence, which are deemed
to have their own spheres of influence, or “areas of special responsibility.” Such
a philosophy treats other countries to merely be objects of international relations.
In this picture, Ukraine is doomed to be a pawn on a global chessboard, as it is
perceived by Russian politicians primarily as a country with limited sovereignty,
which falls upon the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. Regardless of the affiliation
with the above-mentioned groups, Russian politicians have been traditionally
perceiving Kyiv’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy with
indulgence and disdain. At the same time, representatives of all three groups,
although for different reasons, expressed readiness to violate the territorial
integrity of Ukraine for the sake of Russian “national interests.”
POPULAR DEMAND FOR THE LUKYANOV DOCTRINE
Like the citizens of other post-Soviet states, Russians paid a high price for
the bankruptcy of the Soviet planned economy. The drop in real income and rise
in mortality rates were enormous. Some estimates suggest that in the 1990s, up
to 41.5% of the population lived below the poverty line. 77 Accustomed to
paternalism and public welfare that persisted for decades, many failed to adjust
to the new reality. Opinion polls showed that 82% of Russians regretted the fall
of the USSR, and merely 16% did not share this attitude. 78 The more difficult
the situation in the economy, the stronger the longing for the past. In fact, public
nostalgia for the USSR was a protest against poverty, a manifestation of the
dissatisfaction with worsened living conditions. In a sense, the concept of “back
in the USSR” became the Russian national idea of the 1990s. Of course, that
went hand in hand with the growing demand for an assertive great-power
narrative and neo-imperial approach toward the “near abroad” countries.
As a result, the majority of Russians perceived other post-Soviet states not
as fully-fledged sovereign and independent countries, but as temporary
75. SERGEI BABURIN, VOZVRASHCHENIE RUSSKOGO KONSERVATIZMA 443 (2012).
76. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, ROSSIIA V OBVALE 78–79 (1998).
77. WORLD BANK, SNIZHENIE BEDNOSTI V ROSSII: VLIIANIE EKONOMICHESKOGO ROSTA I
SOTSIAL’NYKH REFORM, 117–120 (2006), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/844271468
095342039/pdf/355190RU0Reducing0poverty01OFFICIAL0USE1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN6UU2Z9].
78. VTsIOM, Opinion poll, WCIOM (Jan. 30, 2000), https://wciom.ru/zh/print_q.php?s_id=
349&q_id=28269&date=30.01.2000 [https://perma.cc/BDE7-BP3W].
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breakaway territories which would sooner or later be re-incorporated with
Russia. Not surprisingly, since 1991, 55–65% of Russians do not consider
Ukraine to be a foreign state. 79 Interestingly, it is clearly evident from the polls
that the more complicated the Russo-Ukrainian relations are, the more Russians
tend to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. Moreover, such public
sentiments were nurturing demand for corresponding political rhetoric.
Zyuganov’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Zhirinovsky’s
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia were always quick to meet that demand,
bluntly calling for the restoration of the Soviet empire. For the same purpose,
the Kremlin leadership was launching one integration project after another,
seeking to convince the electorate that each of the integration projects was a step
forward on the way to restoration of political union between “fraternal
republics” under Moscow’s lead. What the Kremlin really wants from the
Ukrainian government is the public demonstration of compliance with
Moscow’s preponderance. It is extremely important since such behavior meets
the expectations of the Russian electorate, especially the elder generation, and,
thus, it contributes greatly to the legitimization of the political regime. In fact,
playing the card of the great power is the easiest way to gain popular support
within a society hit by post-imperial syndrome.
In the early 2010s, sociologists observed controversial trends within the
Russian society. On the one hand, about 35% of the population demanded that
Russia strengthen its influence on the international affairs and make Russia a
more discernible player in the post-Soviet space, striving for the status of a
superpower like the USSR. 80 On the other hand, there was a growing
understanding that Russia, in comparison with the Soviet Union, was in many
respects a different country, while the post-Soviet states had their own national
interests and foreign policy priorities that might not correspond with the Russian
ones. Hence, it was obvious that restoration of the USSR was hardly possible in
a long-term perspective. Against this background, 48% of Russians preferred
Russia to be among the ten most developed economic countries. 81 That led the
pollsters to a conclusion that the views of Russians on foreign policy were
becoming more pragmatic and less oriented on the model of “‘besieged
fortress.’” 82 Nevertheless, despite the growing demand for a foreign policy
model that could better contribute to households’ well-being, Russians’
perception of Ukraine as a semi-sovereign state did not change that much over

79. Levada Centre, ‘Rossiianie ob Ukrainie’, LEVADA CTR. (Nov. 12, 2013), https://www.le
vada.ru/2013/11/12/rossiyane-ob-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/M9JD-MKSM].
80. Vladimir V. Petukhov, Foreign Policy Priorities in the Mass Consciousness of Russians,
51 SOC. RES. 14, 14–31 (2012).
81. Id. at 22–23.
82. Id. at 30.
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the years. Consequently, it is not only economic factors that provoked intensive
revitalization of old Soviet foreign policy patterns among Russian society.
CONCLUSION
After the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war, many
falsely believed the Brezhnev Doctrine was no longer relevant. Initially, postRussia manifested a clear intention to proceed its further development through
closer integration with the West, as well as building democratic and market
economy institutions. Indeed, such a vision of Russia’s future presumed a
resolute denial of Soviet diplomatic practices and demanded a totally new
foreign policy paradigm built on new principles: adherence to human rights and
international commitments; more transparency and predictability; noninterference in the internal affairs of neighboring states, etc.
However, largely unmet public expectations about reforms, widespread
frustration with sharply decreased living standards, deficit of political
leadership, as well as enduring neo-imperial and nostalgic sentiments prevented
Russia from introducing comprehensive changes in its foreign policy. Besides,
Russian renewal of elites did not take place as was the case with Poland, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and other Central European countries. It was a
common practice, when former Communist party members turned on a dime, to
become democrats after decades of glorifying the authoritarian regime. Staying
in power, they retained many old convictions and classic Cold war clichés. That
is actually why representatives of all political groups spoke the same primitive
language of geopolitics when it came to foreign policy issues, in particular,
relations with Ukraine, in particular.
All those factors, overlapping with the dramatically changed international
situation in the world, gave rise to an altered version of Brezhnev Doctrine,
which is labeled in this Article as “Lukyanov Doctrine.” The latter represents
itself as a Russian foreign policy aimed at restoration of the Kremlin’s sphere of
influence across the post-Soviet area with the means of negative motivation.
Such a policy relies mostly upon the concept of limited sovereignty, treating the
“near abroad” states as formally independent objects of international relations.
To achieve its aim, the Kremlin implements a wide array of tools of negative
motivation: incitement of separatism, economic blackmailing, initiating
territorial claims, and even covert military operations.
The Lukyanov Doctrine provides a resolution for the conceptual
contradiction of Russian policy outlined within the English school of
international relations theory. 83 Specifically, the Kremlin repeatedly denied the
idea of humanitarian military interventions, sticking traditionally to the pluralist
approach, which prioritized codified norms of international law, state

83. See ROY ALLISON, RUSSIA, THE WEST, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION (2013).
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sovereignty, inviolability of national borders, and non-interference in the
internal affairs of other states. Nevertheless, to justify its assertive policy
regarding the post-Soviet area, Russia regularly applied a solidarist approach,
attaching utmost significance to protection of human rights. In fact, the Soviet
leadership did the same in relations with its client states of Central and Eastern
Europe. In this regard, there is an essential continuity between the Soviet and
Russian foreign policy. We may even say that the Lukyanov Doctrine is a
conceptual successor to the Brezhnev Doctrine. And, of course, we may see the
same type of continuity regarding Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. The
Soviets believed Ukraine could only have “Socialist sovereignty” within the
USSR, similar to Vladimir Putin who believes Ukraine is not a country at all.
The problem is that others share the same view as Putin does. Such an attitude
is deeply rooted in the minds of all the Russian political elite and society, who,
by inertia, used to treat Ukraine condescendingly as a younger brother. The
Lukyanov Doctrine will cease to exist at the moment when Russia finally
abandons the concept of limited sovereignty in relations with Ukraine, as well
as other post-Soviet states.
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